ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
the father, the defendant, was riding.
The latter maddno oljection or endeavor
to control his son; and, if he did not,
it was a presumption which a jury
might well make, and which I think
they were bound to notice, that he
assented to that which was done in the
management of the instrument (team)
which did the injury, and therefore, per
consequence, was answerable, provided
the result was not an unavoidable accident, which the jury have found was
not the case, the question of negligence
or wilfulness having been submitted to
them." See, also, Lashbrook v. .Patten,
1 Dav. 316 ; Dunks v. Grey, 3 Fed.
Rep. 862, and cases therein citeJl.
The modem rule of the civil law in
European countries is said to make
every person responsible for injuries
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caused by the acts of persons and things
under his dominion; but a father incurs
no responsibility for the act of his minor
child, if he can prove that he was not
able to prevent the act which gives rise
to the liability: Schouler Dom. Rel.,
sect. 263; Civ. Code France, art. 1384.
The same principle has been adopted in
Louisiana; Cliambaud v. 31ayo, 19 La.
(0. S.) 414. For the rules of the
Roman Civil Code, see Gains, 6 iv.,
75; Inst. Lib. iv. tit. viii.; Hunter's
Roman Law (London ed.) (1876) p. 51.
Upon the whole, though the principal
case goes rather farther than any common-law case we have seen, it seems to
be based upon sound principles, and to
establish a salutary doctrine.
MAPSHALL D. EWELL.
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ACTION.

See Bills and Notes; Contract.
AGENT.

See Trover.

Proof of Autlrity- Canvassing Agent.-The employment of a canvassing agent for the sale of books by subscriptipn, confers no authority
to receive payment for books sold but not delivered by him, nor ever
in his possession: ButLer v. Dorman, 68 Mo. 298, followed. Chambers

v. Short, 79 Mo.
ASSIGNMENT.

See Partnership.

Invalidity,6Conveyance offuture Wages.-An assignment of wages to
1 From J. H. Lumpkin, Esq., Reporter; the cases will probably appear in 59
or 60 Ga. Rep.
2 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 136 Mass Rep.
3 From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 79 M o. Rep.
4 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter* to appear in 14 R. I. Rep.
5 Fr6m T. K. Conover, Reporter; the cases will probably appear in 70 or 71
Wis. Rep.
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fall due from any future employer, with whom -no contract nor engagement for employment exists at the time of the assignment is void. Such
wages are a mere possibility, without conjoined interest and not assignable: Kennedy v. I'ernay, 14 R. I.
Invalidity-Reservation of Propertyexempt by Law.-An assignment
for the benefit of creditors of all the property of the assignor, "saving
and excepting * * * all such articles of household furniture and other
effects as are exempt by law from seizure and sale on execution," is void
for uncertainty, and because such reservation is fraudulent as giving to
the assignor a right at any time to withdraw by selection a part of the
goods assigned: Goll v. Hubbell, 59 or 60 Wis.
ATTACHMENT.

Affldavi t-Sufficiency of.-An affidavit for an attachment stating that
the defendant has disposed of or assigned, &c., "his property or any
part thereof," or is about to do so, with intent, &c., is insufficient.
Perjury could not be assigned thereon: Goodear Rubber Co. v.
Knapp, 59 or 60 Wis.
BILLS AND. NOTES.

See Surety.

Unaccepted Draft-Suit on.-Where a draft was drawn and endorsed
by the drawer and placed in the hands of the payee, who was also the
drawee, but was never accepted by him, it was, in legal effect, a promissory note, and the payee could bring suit on it as such against the
drawer: De Vaughn v. Hangabook, 70 or 71 Ga.
Endorsement for Collection-Notice to subseguent hwlders-Action
against party collecting.-A bank held a draft payable to the order of
its cashier. He made the following endorsement upon it: "Pay W.
H. Patterson, Cashier, or order, for collection, for account of First
National Bank, Lynchburg, Va., Allen W. Talley, Cashier." The
endorsee made the following endorsement upon the draft: "Pay to
John A. Davis, Agent, or order, for account of Citizens' Bank of Georgia, Atlanta, Ga. W. H..Patterson, Cashier." This was delivered to
Davis, the agent of the Central Railroad. The Citizens' Bank failed;
Davis collected the draft, and the Central Railroad refused to pay the
amount to the original payee of it because the Citizens' Bank had
failed, and being in debt to the railroad, the latter had given it credit
for the amount collected. Held, that the qualified endorsement by the
cashier of the first bank, directing payment to be made to Patterson,
Cashier of the Citizens' Bank, or order, for collection, for account of
First National Bank of Lynchburg, Va., was nothing more than a warrant of attorney authorizing the endorsee to collect the amount due on
the draft for the payee. It conveyed no title except for that purpose,
and was notice to all persons subsequently dealing with it that the
payee had not parted with the title or intended to transfer the ownership of the proceeds to another: Central Railroadv. First Nat. Bank
of Lynchburg, 70 or 71 Ga.
When the second endorsee (the Central Railroad) received the money
from the drawees, it had received, that which belonged to the original
payee, and this put them in privity with such payee to such an extent
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that, upon failure to pay on demand, an action for money bad and
received would lie. Id.
The reception by one of money which belongs to another, and a
demand by that other, makes all the privity necessary to maintain an
action fbr money had and received: Id.
COMMON CARRIER.
Contracts for Ezvemption from Liability-Negligence-Duty as to
Providing Facilitiesfor Transportation.-Acontract by which a common carrier undertakes to relieve himself of all liability for damages
occasioned by any delay in transportation, and to impose them upon the
shipper, will be effectual to protect the carrier only against the consequences of delays not caused by his own negligence: Dawson v. The
Chicago & Alton Railroad Co., 79 Mo.
It is the duty of a common carrier to provide sufficient facilities and
means of transportation for all freight which it should reasonably expect
will be offered, but it is not bound to provide in advance for extraordinary occasions, nor for an unusual influx of business which is not
reasonably to be expected: Id.
If a common carrier receive property for transportation without any
agreement to the contrary, he thereby undertakes to carry and deliver
it within a reasonable time, regardless of any extraordinary or unexpected pressure of business upon him: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.

Taking of Land-Chanying Course of Stream.-By the construction
of a ditch for the purpose of preserving a highway, the waters of a river
were diverted from one part of the land of a riparian owner and thrown
tipon anoth6r part thereof in such a way as to change the condition and
cut away a portion of the bank. Hield, that there was a taking of his
land within the meaning of the statute (Sects. 1236, 1237, R. S.), and
that he was entitled to compensation therefor: Smith v. Gould, 59 or
60 Wis.
Statute autlorizing Act judicially decared to be a Nuisance.-After
the determination by this court, on a bill in equity, that the ringing of
a bell on a mill, at a certain hour in the morning, was a private nuisance
to the- plaintiff, and after a final injunction was issued restraining such
ringing, the Statute of 1883, c. 84, was passed, authorizing "manufacturers and others employing workmen, for the purpose of giving
notice to such employees, to ring bells and use whistles and gongs of
such size and weight, in such manner and at such hours as the board
of aldermen of cities and towns may in writing designate." The selectmen of the town where the mill was situated granted a license to the
owner to ring the bell on the mill at the hour at which he was prevented from ringing it by the injunction. Held, on a bill of review
brought by the mill-owner, seeking to have the injunction modified,
that the statute was constitutional, and that the bill could be maintained;
Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass.
Retrospective Legislation- Auniifpal Taxation-Special Law.Where a municipal corporation has, in the due exercise of a power con.
ferred upon it by the legislature, assessed and levied a tax upon certain
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property within its limits, the legislature may, by an act retrospective in
its terms, and which takes effect before such tax becomes due, annul
the assessment so made, and vest in another body the power to make
the assessment for that year: State v. St. L., K. C. & IV. Railway Co.,
79 Mo.
The act "to provide for the assessment and collection of taxes on
b:idges owned by joint stock companies, and property and franchises
owned by telegraph and express companies," is not a special law within
the meaning of the constitutional inhibition against the passage of local
or special laws: Id.
CONTRACT.

See Corporation.

Agreement to pay third Party- Variation of Writing by Faroz.-By
a written agreement made in the presence of C.. D. agreed with P., for
a valuable consideration, to pay $300 to C. out of certain moneys, before
sat; fying other claims therewith, and at the same time accepted an order
on him by P. in favor of C. for $300 to be paid first out of said moneys.
In an action by C. against D. for the $300, held, that C. had a vested
interest in the contract to that extent, and that evidence of a parol contemporaneous agreement between P. and D., varying the terms of the
written contract as to the payment of said $300, was inadmissible
Cook v. Durham, 59 or 60 Wis.
Agreement of Corporaton-Distinctionbetween Penalty and Liguidated Damages.-A. sealed instrument began "An agreement made this
* * * between the A. company, party of the first part, by B. agent,
and C. and D. parties of the second part, herewith." * * * In the
instrument the parties were spoken of merely as "the said party of the
first part," and "the said parties of the second part.' The testimonium
clause was: "In witness whereof, the parties have hereunto affixed
their hands and seals the year and day first above Written." It was
signed "B., agent." [L. s.] C. [L. s.] D. [L. s.] Held, that it was the
deed of the A. company. Bradstreet v. Baker, 14 R. I..
The instrument provided that the A. company was to furnish, and C.
and D. were to receivef between certain dates, five thousand tons of ice
at a specified price, and that C. and D. were to pay in full in cash at
the same price for all ice not received by them at the last date; such
ice not received to remain the property of the C. company. C. and D.
made default by not receiving the ice: Id.
In covenant brought against them by the A. company : Held, that
the stipulated price for the five thousand tons was a penalty, not liquidated damages. Hleld, further, that the A. company should receive its
actual damages: Id.
Serv es-Presumption-.Parent and Child- W7L.-Valuable services, which would, as between strangers, raise an implied promise to pay
for them, when performed for a person in loco parentis,will not of themselves have that effect; and this whether they are performed wholly
during minority or partly after majority: Cowell v. Roberts, 79 Mo.
In an action against the estate of a deceased person for services performed for him during his lifetime, Held, that his will making provision for the plaintiff was properly admitted in evidence as corroborative
of the claim made in defence that the position of plaintiff was that of a
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member of the family of the deceased, and as bearing upon the supposed
undertaking to pay wages for his services: Id.
-Public Policy-Price for Recommendation.-C. requested A. to
recommend to him a builder "that you can endorse in every way
responsible and reliable," who could erect a building for him cheaper
than certain other builders. A. recommended B., who orally promised
to pay A. a sum of money "for his trouble." B. was employed by C.,
erected the building, and was paid. Held, that A. could not maintain
an action against B. on his promise: Holcomb v. Weaver, 136 Mass.
See Contract.
Stock-Payment otherwisethan in Money- Consideation-Rewspaper
Articdes.-Payment of shares in a corporation may be made otherwise
than in money: Liebkce v. .Knapp, 79 Mo.
It is not ultravrires a corporation organized for the purpose of carrying
out a public enterprise, e. g., the building of a bridge over the Mississippi river, to contract with the proprietor of a newspaper to have publisbed therein statistical articles and communications favoring the project,
and showing the value of the enterprise as an investment; neither is
such a contract contrary to public policy: .1d.
'Certain shares of the stock of a corporation organized to construct a
bridge over the Mississippi river were issued to the proprietor of a newspaper published in the city where the bridge was to be built. The consideration therefor, was the publication of articles and communications
in the newspaper favoring the enterprise and pointing out its need and
value to the community, and its standing as an investment. It was not
contended that the consideration was inadequate. Held, that the stock
wan fully paid : Id.
Vetng of Stock in one Idi iual.-One who, by purchase or otherwise, becomes the owner of all the capital stock of a private corporation,
does not thereby become the legal owner of its property, and cannot
maintain replevin therefor in his own name: Button v. Rtoffman,, 59 or
60 Wis.
CORPORATION.

CRImINAL LAw.

See Equity.

DAMAGES.

Action against ib~ler'ff for Escape.-In case against a sheriff for an
escape the measure of damages is the damages actually sustained by the
plaintiff; the amount of the judgment in the action wherein the escape
took place being only primafacie evidence, open to rebuttal by the
sheriff: bVeldon v. Upham, 14 R. I.
DEBTOR AND CREDnou.

See Assignment; Equity.

DEED.

.Execution in Presence of two Witnesses.-A statute required for the
validity of a deed that it should be executed in the presence of two witnesses. The deed bore the signature of one attesting witness. When
it was executed a daughter of the ,grantor was also in and out of the
room, but not as it appeared for the purpose of being a witness. ield,
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that the deed was not executed in the presence of two witnesses : Zenyon v. Segar, 14 R. I.
Words " Subject to Mortgage"-Construction.-Thewords "subject
to mortgage" in a conveyance of one of two parcels of land which had
been mortgaged together, Held, not to imply that the incumbrance
was to be satisfied wholly out of the parcels so conveyed, or that the
grantee assumed any personal liability for the mortgaged debt: Hall v.
Morgan, 79 Mo.
EQUITY.

See Partnership; Trade-Mark.

Creditor'sBill-Necessity of Judgment.-A creditor cannot maintain
a bill in equity to set aside a conveyance of his debtor as fraudulent,
until his demand has been reduced to judgment: and this means a
judgment in this state, not a judgment of a sister state : Grim v. Walker,
79 Mo.
Will iwt aid CHminal Court.-Chancery takes no part in the administration of the criminal law. It neither aids the criminal courts in the
exercise of jurisdiction nor retains or obstructs them : Pope v. Mayor,
&c., of Savannah, 70 or 71 Ga.
Euitable Relief for Tort--Insolvency of Wrongdoer--Fraud.-F.
and H. holding notes secured by &joint mortgage on certain land and a
frame dwelling house thereon, obtained a decree for foreclosure of the
mortgage, gale of the property and pro rata application of the proceeds
to the payment of their demands. On the eve of the sale, which took
place under this decree, H., expecting F. to become the purchaser, and
intending to defraud him, moved the house and placed it upon land of
his own. F., in ignorance of what H. had done, bid and bought at the
sale, the price bid being but a small part of the aggregate amount of
the mortgage debts. H. was insolvent. Held, that ordinarily F's
remedy against him would be an action for damages, but as this, owing
to his insolvency, would be fruitless, F. might maintain a proceeding in
equity to recover of H. the value of the house with interest, and to subject his land and the house to the payment thereof; and it was imtnaterial whether the makei of the notes was solvent or not: Fox. v.
Hubbard, 79 Mo.
Practice- acts not Embraced in Pleadings-Decree.-A decree in
equity must be founded upon facts consistent with and embraced within
the pleadings. The prayer for general relief authorizes the court to
.grant any relief within these limits, but not beyond. If a state of facts
not pleaded is developed at the trial, the pleadings should be ambnded:
otherwise they cannot be made the basis of any relief: Newham v.
Kenton, 79 Mo.
EVWeNOE. See Contract.
Mental Capacity-E-xpert.-Onthe issue of the mental capacity of a
person at a particular time, a witness who is not an expert may be
asked whether he noticed any difference in such person's mode of doing
business at that time and at a previous time: Commonwealth v. Brayman, 136 Mass.
A witness who is not an expert may testify whether within a given
time a person has failed mentally or physically; but a witness who is

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

not an expert cannot be asked his opinion as to the mental capacity of
a person at a'certlin time; and this rule excludes all persons, except
those having scientific training on the subject, or physicians, from
giving their opinions: Id.
FRAUDS,

STATUTE OF.

Incomplete Memorandum-ParolEvidence.-When a written memorandum does not purport to be a complete expression of the entire contract, or a part only of it is reduced to writing, the matter omitted may
be supplied by parol evidence: Blis v. Bray, 79 Mlo.
A memorandum was as follows: "Received of Daniel Ellis the sum
of $165 to apply as purchase-money on a half interest in the following
described lands, (describing them)." Held, that it was competent to
show by parol what was the full amount of the consideration and when
payable: Id.
GIFT.

Delivery of Savings-Bank Books.-The delivery of a thing given is
not necessary when the intended donee is already in possession of it,
but in such a case the gift if completed and unambiguous may be effected
by a simple oral declaration : Providence Ins. for Savings v. Taft, 14
.R.I.
The gift of a savings-bank pass-book is in effect a gift of the deposit: Id.
Tiling)astv. Wheaton, 8 R. I., 536, affirmed: Id.
Deos in Savnnys-Bank--(Jstody of Boo.-H. deposited a sum
of money in a savings-bank in the name of E., "subject to the order of
H." A few days afterwards H. asked E. to come to his house, showed
him the deposit-bo], said he was going to give it to him, and delivered
it temporarily into his possession. H. then said he would keep the book
for E., as he had a safe, and took it and put it into the safe. On the
same day, by E.'s request, H. signed and delivered to E.a paper certifying .that the money was for him. H. never drew the interest upon
the deposit, but allowing it to accumulate during his life, doing nothing
to assert, a personal ownership. E. gave seasonable notice to the bank
that he should claim the money; but the bank paid the same to H.'s
administrator. Held, in an action by E. against the bank, after the
death of H., for the amount of the deposit, that the jury were authorized
to find a complete gift of the money by H. to E.; and that the bank had
sufficient notice thereof: Eastman v. Woronoco Savings-Bank, 136
Mass.
GUARDIAN.

Marriageof Female Guardian-Efect of-Liability to Ward.-At
common law, when a woman who was a guardian married, her letters of
guardianship abated, a married woman being incapable of being a guardian. The reason for this was that married women were unable to contract or give bond and security, were not sui jaris, and had become liable
to the control of their husbaiids ; but since the "married woman's act"
of 1866, these reasons have been removed as to her private property,
and- she could be a guardian. If a woman, who was guardian of her
children bj her first marriage, remarried and suffered her last husband
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to use, or in conjunction with him, used the land of such children, and
consumed the rents, whether her letters abated upon her marriage or
not, she is liable to them for such rents : Hood v. Perry, 70 or 71 Ga.
EIUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Guardian.

Gift by Wife-Conversion by Husband of Wife's Property-Creditor's
Bill-Distribution of Fund.-If it be allowable at all fbr a married
woman to make a parol gift of her separate personal property to her
husband, since the Married Woman's Property Act of 1874, (Acts 1875,
p. 61,) the conservation of the legislative purpose as evinced in that act,
should at least incline the courts to exact the most cogent proof to
establish such a gift: Rieper v. Wehrmann, 79 Mo.
A married woman whose separate personal property had, without
her consent, been delivered by her bailee to her husband, and by him
been converted to his own use, brought this action to subject to the
payment of the indebtedness thus arising a stock of goods in the hands
of her husband, and praying for the appointment of a receiver. The
goods were not the identical property converted, but were purchased in
part, but in part only, with the proceeds of that property. .ekd, that
the equitable principal which prevents the following of a trust fund
after it has changed its form and become mingled with and undistinguishable from the rest of the trustee's property, had no application,
and that the action could be maintained. field, also, that in such case
the married woman had no lien at the outset, and did not acquire one
by the institution of the action; that her position was that of a general
creditor, and she was entitled to sharepro rata, and not otherwise, with
other general creditors who had come in and proved up their demands
before distribution of the fund in the hands of the receiver; but that
her equity was superior to that of the bailee, who was also one of the
general creditors and had proved up, and that she was entitled to full
satisfaction before he received anything : Id.
Aarriage-Invaliditybecause af lnsanity-AMay be proved in Collateral Action.-Where a claim or defence depends upon the question
whether a person was of sound or unsound mind at the time of the marriage, it is not necessary that there should have been a decree of nullification or divorce in the lifetime of such person. The question may be
made and decided in a proceeding to obtain year's support by his widow
after his death; and an objection to the granting of such year's support
on the ground that the deceased was of unsound mind and incapable of
contracting marriage before the pretended marriage, at the time thereof,
and until his death, and that the marriage was, therefore, null and void,
was not demurrable: Bell v. Bennett, 70 or 71 Ga.
INSOLVENCY.

Belief of Insolvency-Reasonable Cause-Proof of Insolvency.-If
facts are known to a creditor, which give him reasonable cause to believe
his debtor to be insolvent, and he also knows that the debtor knows the
same facts, he has reasonable cause to believe that the debtor believes
himself to be insolvent, and that a payment of the debt by him is made
in fraud of the laws relating to insolvency: Cozzens v. Holt, 136
Mass.
VoL,. XXX.-86
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If a debtor is insolvent before making payment of his debt, and there
is no evidedce of a subsequent change in his financial condition, a jury
will be warranted in finding that he was insolvent at the time of the
payment : Id.
INSURANCE.

Fraudulent Representations by Agent-.Action to recover back Premium.-If a person is induced, by the false and fraudulent ,representations of the agent of an insurance company, to take a policy of insurance
in the company, and to pay the premium thereon, he may rescind the
contract, and, in an action against such agent, recover as damages
the amount of the premium so paid: Heddon v. Grzff n, 136 Mass.
JUDGMENT.

When Irregular and not Void-Notion to Vacate-When must be
made.-A judgment as by default entered by the clerk upon a complaint
which is imperfectly verified and fails to state a cause of action, is
irregular but not void. For purposes of review it will be deemed the
judgment of the court and an adjudication that the complaint is sufficient and duly verified : Anderson v. Anderson, 59 or 60 Wis.
A motion to set aside a judgment for a mere irregularity must be
made at the same term, or, if the judgment is entered in vacation, at
the next term at which the motion can be heard : Id.
LBEL.

Newspaper Article-Evidence-Aalice.-At the trial of an indictment
against the publisher of a.newspaper for libel, who offers evidence of the
truth of the statements in the alleged libel, other publications in the same
paper, if they tend to show general ill-will towards the person alleged
to have been libelled, and are of such a nature as to indicate a persistent disposition of hatred towards him, or if they appear to be a part
of a settled purpose to bring him into public hatred, contempt or ridicule, and are sufficiently near in time to afford a natural inference that
the same state of mind .existed when the alleged libellous publication
was made, are admissible in evidence, although they are published subsequently to the alleged libel, and do not expressly refer to it: Commonwealth v. Damon, 136 Mass.
At the trial of an indictment against the publisher of a newspaper for
'libel, if the truth of the matters contained in the alleged libel, evidence
of which is offered, is established, the government must show that the
defendant, in a legal sense, actually participated in or authorized the
publication, and that he did this with an actual malicious intention : Id.
' At-the trial of an indictment against the publisher of a newspaper
for libel, who offered evidence of the truth of the statements in the
alleged libel, the judge instructed the jury that, "if the truth of the
article is established as claimed by the defendant; it is a perfect and complete defence, unless express malice in the publication is shown-malice
in the popular sense of hatred and ill-will." Held, that the defendant
had no ground of exception: Id.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

Rnal determinationof (Jr,3inalAction-Entry of Nolle ProsequiInstigation without probable cause.-Until the final determination of a
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criminal action no action for the malicious prosecution thereof can be
maintained: Woodworth v. Mills, 59 or 60 Wis.
The entry of a nolle prosequi for any reason other than some irregularity or informality in the information itself, is an end to the prosecution
of that case, and,.unless such nolle is vacated at the same term, the
defendant can be further prosecuted for the same offence, if at all,
only upon anew complaint, arrest, and examination : .1d.
Such entry of a nolle prosequiis, therefore, such a final determination
of the action that an action for its malicious prosecution may be
maintained: Id.
If the defendant in an action for the malicious prosecution of a
criminal action instigated such prosecution without probable cause, the
fact that the person who, at his instigation, made the criminal complaint
had probable cause to believe it to be true, is no defence: Id.
See Deed; Subrogation.
MORTGAGE.
Chattels not in Ess.-A mortgage of personal property not yet in
esse, the production of which is in the contemplation of the parties,
will impose a lien in equity thereon when produced. Wright v. Bircher,
72 Mo., followed: Sutherford v. Stewart, 79 Mo.
Lien-Piority as between -Mortgagesexecuted on same Day-Intention.-Ordinarily mortgages executed the same day have equal liens on
the mortgaged property, without regard to fractions of a day: Coleman
v. Carhart,70 or 71 Ga.
But where facts apparent on the faces of the mortgages show that it
was the intention of the parties to give the preference to one over the
others, that lien so preferred will be enforced, though all were executed
the same day: Id.
Thus, where one of mortgages, all given on land for purchase-money,
makes no reference at all to any of the others on its face, and the others
on their faces refer to it as already in existence, and it, so referred to,
is made to secure the note first falling due, the intention of the parties
to prefer it may be gathered from these facts apparent on the face of
the papers: Id.
NEGIGENCE.

Contributory-Turning Cattle into Land with Knowledge that Fence
had been Destroyed.-One who, knowing that a severe storm on Sunday
had prostrated fences, on Monday evening turned his cattle upon uninclosed lands, without inquiry as to whether the railroad fences abutting
them were uninjured, was guilty of such contributory negligence as
would defeat his recovery for injuries received by such cattle on the
railroad track; and such facts appearing from his own evidence a nonsuit should have been granted: Carey v. C., AH. & St. P. Railroad Co.,
59 or 60 Wis.
A railroad company is bound only to use ordinary diligence in repairing its fences: Id.
PARENT AND CI0LD.

See

Contract.

PARTNERSHIP.
-Assignment by one Partner-Delvery.-One of several copartners
cannot make an assignment of the partnership property to pay the part-
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nership debts without the consent of his copartners, if they are present
or where they can be consulted: Petition of Daniels, 14 R. I.
But one of several copartners can make such an assignment if, being
in charge of the property he acts in good faith to meet a crisis in the
business, although without the consent of his copartners, when they are
absent or where they cannot be consulted : Id.
When actual delivery of goods cannot be made, a symbolical delivery
suffices : Id.
An assignee of property, a part of which was under attachment, took
possession of that not attached and demanded that attached. Held,
that he had done all that was necessary to perfect his title: Id.
Bil for Sale of Patent- Use by surviving Partner.-Abill in equity
may be maintained by the administrator of a deceased partner against
the surviving partner, for a sale of letters patent belonging to the partnership, and for an account of the profits received by the surviving
partner from the use of the patent since the dissolution of the partnership : Freeman v. Freeman, 136 Mass.
Subseguent Incorporation of-Effect on Creditors not .Notfed.Where partners have dealt as such with a seller, and after becoming
incorporated continue to deal as before, having their bills made in the
same way, without giving any notice of their altered condition, they will
continue to be liable as partners, unless the seller have knowledge
thereof derived from some other source: Martin v. Feweill, 79 Mo.
Partnership Notefor Individual Debt.-The plaintiffs, at St. Louis,
sent a reaper to C. K. & Co. (a firm), at Sullivan, Missouri. C. K. &
Co., afterward reported by letter, that they had sold the reaper to K., a
member of their firm, and sent the note of the firm for the price. It
turned out, that K. had made the transaction and written the letter
wholly without the knowledge of the other members of the firm, and had
alone gotten the benefit, but it also appeared that they habitually left
the management of the business to K., and permitted him, whenever he
wanted goods, to take them and charge them to himself. Held, that by
their conduct they had brought themselves within the rule that, where
one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third party, he
shall suffer who has been the cause or occasion of the confidence or credit
reposed in such third party, and that they were liable on the note:
Hayner v. Crow, 79 Mo.
PATENT.
PUBLIC POLICY.
RAILROAD.

See Partnership.
See Contract; Clorporation.
See Common Carrier.

SUBROGATION.

Mortgage- When Payrient entitles to Subrogation.-If a party purchasing land subject to a mortgage, contracts with the mortgagor to
pay the mortgage debt, and afterward the mortgagor is compelled to pay
it himself, he will be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee as
against such purchaser and- any one claiming under him with notice:
Orrick v. Durham, 79 Mo.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SURETY.

.ond of Bank LClerk-hange of Duties.-In an action against the
sureties upon a bond, given to a bank, and conditioned for the faithful
discharge by C. of " all his duties as clerk of said bank," and against
the misappropriation of any of the funds of the bank "which may come
under the care or control of said C. as clerk," the evidence showed that
C., during.the whole term of his employment, performed the duty, to
some extent, usually performed by a teller, of paying and receiving
money over the counter of the bank. It was found as a fact that "the
duties as clerk," contemplated in the bond, did not mean merely the
duties of a bookkeeper, but that they embraced the duty of receiving
and paying out money at the counter of the bank. field, that the
defendants were not entitled to a ruling, as matter of law, that there had
been such a change in the duties of the clerk as to discharge them from
liability: Rollstone Nat. Bank v. Carleton, 136 Mass.
Right of Actilm against PrincipaL-Thepayee of a promissory note,
given as collateral security for his liability as endorser of another note
made by the same person, may maintain an action thereon against the
maker, although payment of the other note has not been enforced, and
it is still outstanding and unpaid: Hapgood v. Wellington, 136 Mass.
TRADEMARK.

Colorable Imitation of Label.-A. made and sold "Morse's Syrup of
Yellow Dock Root." B. sold a medicinal preparation in bottles having
the words, "Dr. Morse's Celebrated Syrup" blown in the glass, and
resembling perfectly A.'s bottles in size and shape. The labels used by
A. and B. were different, and A.s bottles were wrapped in a paper cover
while B.'s were not. field, that A. was entitled to an injunction against
B., an& to an account of the profits derived from the use of bottles similar to those used by A.: Alexander v. Morse, 14 R. I.
A. made his preparation under one trade name and sold it under
another. He also advertised it as "sold only in quart bottles," while
his bottles, though known among druggists as quart bottles, held substantially less than a quart. *Held, that this was immaterial : Id.
What constitutes a colorable imitation of medicine bottle wrappers
and labels: Id.
TRIAL.
Additional Charge in absence of Counsel.-After the evidence had
closed, the arguments had been completed, and the jury had been
charged with the case and retired for consultation, the court took a
recess until the next morning, at the same time remarking that he
would receive the verdict -if it was agreed upon at any time before
eleven o'clock that night. The jury not agreeing, the judge, during
the recess and before eleven o'clock at night, in the absence of one
party and their counsel and without their consent, had the jury brought
into the court room and delivered another charge to them on the main
points in the case. Held, that this was error, and will necessitate a new
trial. The announcement of the court was notice that nothing more
would be done in the case during the recess than to receive the verdict,
and parties had the right to act upon this and absent themselves:
Bryant v. Simmons, 70 or 71 Ga.
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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

TROVER.
Conversion--What amounts to-Agent.-The refusal by one having
the chattelof another to deliver it to the owner on demand, is ordinarily prima facie evidence of a conversion: Singer Manunf. Co. v.
King, 14 R. I.
A bailee who has received a chattel in good faith from one not the
owner may refuse to deliver it to the demanding owner till he has
had time to ascertain the ownership: Id.
A servant who has received a chattel from his master may retain it
till be has consulted his master, but if after consultation he relies on
his master's title and refuses to deliver it to the demanding owner, he
is guilty of a conversion : Id.
An agent received a chattel from a fellow employee, and acting
under prior instructions from his principal refused to deliver it to the
demanding owner until storage bad been paid. The claim for storage
was untenable in law. Held, that the agent was guilty of conversion : Id.
WAGES. See Assignment.
WILL.
After-acguired Property.-A statute provided "every person of the
age of twenty-one years and of sound mind * * * may * * * devise

any lands, tenements or hereditaments acquired subsequently to the execution of his will, provided his intention to devise the same appears by
the express terms of his will. A residuary devise was as follows: "All
the rest, residue and remainder of my property of every kind, nature
and description, and wherever the same may be, I give, devise and
bequeath unto my son." Held, that the devise did not carry the testator's realty acquired subsequent, to the execution of the will: Church
v. The Warren Manuf. Co., 14 R. I.
Statute preventing Lapse-Legacy prompted by Friendship.-Testamentary gifts prompted by the personal regard of the testator for the
legatees were given by a will made while the following statute was in force:
" Whenever any child, grandchild or other person, having a devise or
bequest of real or personal estate, shall die before the testator, leaving
a lineal descendant, such descendant shall take the estate, real or personal, as devisee or legatee, in the same way and manner as such devisce
or legatee would have done in case he had survived the testator." The
legatees died before the testator, but left lineal descendants. Held,
that the statute should be interpreted to supplement not to defeat the
testgtor's intention. Held, further, that the will must be presumed to
have been made in view of the statute. Held, further, that the statute
applied to the legacies unless it appeared from the will that the-testator's intent was not to allow the legacies to go to the descendants under
the statute: Dom. & -For.Nis. Soc. v. Pell, 14 R. I.

